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In 
nerAcceleration and Time Pathologies 
The critique of psychology in Heidegger’s
Beiträge
Kevin A. Aho
ABSTRACT. In his Contributions to Philosophy, Martin Heidegger
(1999) introduces ‘acceleration’ as one of the three symptoms – along
with ‘calculation’ and the ‘outbreak of massiveness’ – of our techno-
logical way of ‘being-in-the-world’. In this article, I unpack the 
relationship between these symptoms and draw a twofold conclusion.
First, interpreting acceleration in terms of time pathologies, I suggest
the self is becoming increasingly fragmented and emotionally 
overwhelmed from chronic sensory arousal and time pressure. This
experience makes it difficult for us to qualitatively distinguish what
matters to us in our everyday lives, resulting in a pervasive cultural
mood of indifference, what Heidegger (1995) calls ‘profound
boredom’. Second, by drawing on Heidegger’s hermeneutic method, I
argue that the practice of mainstream psychology, by adopting the
reductive methodology of the empirical sciences, largely ignores our
accelerated socio-historical situation, resulting in therapeutic models
that have a tendency to construct and perpetuate the very pathologies
the psychologist is seeking to treat. KEY WORDS • acceleration •
boredom • Heidegger • hermeneutics • psychologyOur hour is the epoch of going-under. (Heidegger, 1999)
1881, the physician George M. Beard introduced the phrase ‘American 
vousness’ to capture the emotional flatness and exhaustion from a life
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increasingly mediated by the mechanized acceleration and time pressure of the
industrial age. According to Beard, it is not civilization that causes this kind of
emotional strain but the unique social forms of modernity itself. ‘The Greeks
were certainly civilized’, says Beard, ‘but they were not nervous, and in the
Greek language there is no word for the term’ (cited in Lutz, 1991: 4; O’ Malley,
2005: 385) By the late 19th century, nervousness or ‘neurasthenia’ had become
a ubiquitous symptom of an over-stimulated urban existence. Indeed, it can be
argued that emotional exhaustion – emerging in the wake of the technological
advent of speed and the compression of time and space – is the most distinctive
characteristic of modern living and may represent, what historian Arnold
Toynbee calls, ‘the most difficult and dangerous of all the current problems [that
we face today]’ (cited in Ulmer and Schwartzburd, 1996: 329).
One of the historical consequences of an increasingly automated and harried
way of life is the proliferation of certain behavioral and mood disorders that, 
in turn, leads to the emergence and subsequent growth of the mental health
industry that treats these disorders. In this article, I suggest that the mainstream
mental health professions misunderstand the origins of modern nervousness by
interpreting it largely through the procedural lens of the natural sciences – 
privileging the standpoint of detached objectivity and adopting a method that
reduces the self to an encapsulated object and human behavior to elemental
causal interactions. I argue that this disengaged view overlooks, what Martin
Heidegger calls, ‘being-in-the-world’ or ‘Da-sein’, our everyday involvement in
a social and historical background or ‘there’ (Da) that tacitly shapes the way we
live our lives and interpret our own behavior.
Although Heidegger’s decade-long seminars with physicians and psychia-
trists in Zollikon, Switzerland (1959–71)1 represents his most sustained critique
of psychology, I will be focusing my attention on Heidegger’s Beiträge zur
Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) – translated as Contributions to Philosophy (from
Enowning) (1999) – which introduces three overlapping characteristics or
‘symptoms’ that constitute our technological being-in-the-world: ‘calculation’,
‘acceleration’ and ‘the outbreak of massiveness’ (p. 84). Although much has
been written on Heidegger’s view of ‘calculation’ and ‘massiveness’, particu-
larly in light of his later writings on technology, very little has been made of his
conception of ‘acceleration’, the term used to describe the frantic pace of
modern life. By unpacking the relationship between these characteristics I
attempt to appropriate from the Beiträge a historically grounded psychology,
one that offers a hermeneutic critique of the practice of psychology itself. This
critique is based on the fact that mainstream psychology largely overlooks the
accelerated historical situation that the client is ‘thrown’ (geworfen) into, and, as
a result, may be unwittingly perpetuating the accelerated patterns of behavior
that sparked the client’s nervous disorder in the first place.
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Acceleration and the Pathology of Boredom
Written in 1936–8, Heidegger’s Beiträge is considered to be his most important
book after Being and Time (1962). The Beiträge consists of six ‘joinings’ or
‘fugues’ (Fügungen) which, taken together, repeat the same disclosive move-
ment of western history from different perspectives.2 The first fugue, ‘Echo’, is
the primary focus of this project. Echo signals the end of metaphysics, inti-
mating the total withdrawal of the ‘question of being’ (Seinsfrage) in the age of
global technology. According to Heidegger, the distinctively western under-
standing of being is moving toward its nihilistic endpoint in the technological
age. ‘Nihilism’ occurs when we no longer ask the ontological question concern-
ing the being of beings – of how and why beings manifest or show up as they do
– and are instead totally occupied with consuming, exchanging, and producing
beings. As Heidegger (2000) says in his 1935 lecture course, Introduction to
Metaphysics, ‘[Today] we encounter beings everywhere; they surround us, carry
us, enchant and fulfill us, elevate and disappoint us, but where in all this is the
being of beings, and what does it consist in?’ (p. 34). In the age of nihilism, the
world is understood solely as a vast storehouse of objects to be manipulated,
consumed, and quantified by means of ‘machination’. With global machination,
beings are only to the extent that they are ‘re-presentable’, ‘made’, or ‘can be
made’ in terms of calculable production and exchange. To this end, beings are
revealed or show up in ‘lived experience’ (Erlebnis) in only one way, as some-
thing useful, measurable, and familiar to everyone (Heidegger, 1999).
What is significant in the Beiträge is the way in which our contemporary 
forgetfulness of the question of being is felt. Heidegger (1999) refers to this feel-
ing as ‘shock’, a shock accompanied by ‘compelling distress’ (nötigende Not)
(p. 79). However, what is particularly shocking today ‘is the lack of distress’
itself; our way of living is so active, busy and occupied with things that we have
no time for distress (pp. 79, 277, all emphases are from original sources unless
otherwise indicated). In order to come to grips with the ways in which modern
life embodies a hidden distress we must get a clearer picture of what Heidegger
means by the self.
Against the modern view of the self that we inherit from Descartes, Heidegger
suggests the human being (Dasein) is not to be interpreted as a being (Seiende),
a quantifiable material body or an immaterial mind. Dasein is a shared, socio-
historical ‘happening’ (Geschehen) or way of being that opens up a horizon or
‘clearing’ (Lichtung) of intelligibility, a horizon that shapes the way beings are
understood and matter to us in our everyday lives. The self, on this view, is
always already ‘absorbed’ (aufgehen) in a public world and is properly under-
stood not in terms of its objective properties but in terms of what it does, 
‘proximally and for the most part – in [its] average everydayness’, such as 
handling tools, driving to work, surfing the net, shopping (Heidegger, 1962: 16)
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This means I am invariably involved in the acts and practices that ‘They’ or
‘Anyone’ (das Man) are involved in. And if I am what I do, then I am an indis-
tinguishable ‘Anyone’. I interpret myself as a teacher, a husband, or a home-
owner because I have been ‘dispersed’ (zerstreuen) into the public roles and
practices of others. Thus, ‘the self of everyday Dasein is a they-self . . . As a
they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the “they” and must find
itself’ (Heidegger, 1962: 129).
Shaped by a public horizon, we invariably ‘fall prey’ (Verfallen) to modern
assumptions, prejudices, and social fads. In today’s turbo-capitalist economy,
for instance, the self is interpreted as an autonomous subject who, for the most
part, values busy-ness, careerism, and conspicuous consumption. Such public
self-interpretations give our lives a sense of security and comfort, providing the
illusion of living well because we are ‘doing what [everyone else] does’
(Heidegger, 1962: 223). In short, our understanding of things is mediated by the
world into which we are thrown. The problem today is that we are thrown into a
worldview of global machination, a worldview that is totalizing insofar as it
‘blocks off’ or ‘conceals’ any other way to interpret beings, including ourselves
(Heidegger, 1977a: 33). To this end, the present age ‘masters’ us to the extent
that we are forgetful of the historical values and ‘guiding determinations’ that
preceded it (Heidegger, 1962: 20).
As mentioned earlier, Heidegger’s Beiträge identifies three fundamental
‘symptoms’ of modernity that signal the ‘darkening of the world and the des-
truction of the earth . . . calculation, acceleration, and massiveness’ (Heidegger,
1999: 83) Calculation is revealed in the way all things in the world are quantifi-
able and organized in terms of instrumental principles. Through the lens of 
calculation, the mountain stream shows up as acre-feet of water, the forest as
board-feet of lumber, and an office building full of human beings is quantified
as ‘human resources’. In the technological age, all things are subject to the 
governing rules of calculation and ‘the incalculable is here only what has not yet
been mastered’ (p. 84) Thus, calculation becomes the ‘basic law’ of human
behavior, where the organic rhythms of life are organized and compressed with
schedules and plans, and the day is broken down in terms of the productivity of
hours, minutes, seconds, and even tenths-of-seconds. Indeed, in today’s global
economy, where mere fractions of seconds can translate into the gain or loss 
of hundreds of thousands of dollars, the rules of calculation are increasingly 
regulated by a second symptom of the modern age, acceleration.
Acceleration captures the ways in which our everyday life involves a relation
to speed, a frenzied tempo or ‘mania’ embodied in the current tendency of ‘not-
being-able-to-bear the stillness’ (Heidegger, 1999: 84): ‘[It is] the mania for
what is surprising, for what immediately sweeps [us] away and impresses [us],
again and again and in different ways’ (p. 84). This mania is exhibited in every-
day body comportments that are shaped by what social psychologist Robert
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Levine (1997) calls ‘time urgency’. Levine suggests that the accelerated self can
be identified as one who continually glances at his/her watch and checks his/her
cell phone; speaks quickly and becomes frustrated when someone takes too long
to make a point; eats, walks and drives fast and becomes angry when caught in
slow-moving traffic; is compulsively punctual and follows lists and schedules to
manage his/her day; and finds it difficult to wait in line or sit still without some-
thing or someone to distract or occupy him/her.
As a consequence, acceleration reveals a unique relation to time. In the course
of my everyday life, I am captivated with or ‘entranced’ by the exciting things I
encounter ‘now’. For Heidegger (1995), living in the ‘now’ leaves me in a con-
stant state of ‘limbo’ because I am unable to ask how or why I am captivated
with particular things and where this captivation might take me:
This letting oneself go with whatever is happening around us is possible only if,
from the outset, we constantly let whatever is going on come toward us, come up
against us, just as it is given. It is possible only if we are entirely present [ganz
Gegenwart] in the face of whatever is happening around us, or, as we say, only if
we simply make present [gegenwärtigen]. (p. 124)
Being caught up in the Present (Gegenwart) cuts me off from an authentic
awareness of, what Heidegger calls, ‘primordial temporality’.3 To the extent that
the accelerated self is absorbed in the ‘now’, I forget how my life is shaped by
the past and the future, by the temporal structures of ‘situatedness’
(Befindlichkeit) and ‘projection’ (Entwurf). Situatedness refers to the past inso-
far as I am always already ‘thrown’ into a socio-historical situation that deter-
mines how things affect me in terms of certain temperaments or moods.
Projection refers to the future insofar as I am always ‘ahead-of-[my]self’ (sich
vorweg) as I ceaselessly ‘run forward’ into possibilities, into already available
social roles, practices, and identities, until my greatest ownmost (eigenst) possi-
bility, death (Heidegger, 1962). Busily captivated by the ‘Present’, I forget that
I am a ‘thrown project’; I forget the ‘Past’ (Gewesenheit) and the ‘Future’
(Zukunft), that is where my everyday self-interpretation comes from and where
it is heading. Consequently, says Heidegger (1962), ‘the Present leaps away
from its authentic future and from its authentic having been’ (p. 348).
To this end, the symptom of acceleration reveals a self that is fragmented and
disjointed to the extent that it is pulled apart by competing commitments and
investments that are always, for some reason, urgent. Ironically, this kind of
fragmentation can often be experienced most intensely on days of ‘leisure’. As I
wake up on a sunny Saturday morning, I have no obligation to go to the office
but I am still pulled into the ‘now’ as a jumble of pressing possibilities. I must
wash the car, mow the lawn, pick up the dry cleaning, check my email, go for a
jog, buy groceries, pay the bills, and if I finish these tasks I can watch the foot-
ball game in the evening. By day’s end I am not relaxed and contented but
AHO: PSYCHOLOGY IN HEIDEGGER’S BEITRÄGE 29
exhausted, wondering where the day went. Thus, as Kenneth Gergen (1991)
points out, the paradox of accelerated living is that it does not result in exhila-
rating satisfaction but often with a feeling of being defeated and overwhelmed.
This feeling of defeat is prompted by, what cardiac psychologists Diane Ulmer
and Leonard Schwartzburd (1996) call, ‘hurry sickness’, referring to a self that
suffers from ‘severe and chronic feelings of time urgency that have brought
about changes affecting personality and lifestyle’ (p. 331).4 The self is caught in
a repeating cycle of behavior, a ‘time pathology’ that nervously hungers for
more things, more distractions, and interprets his/her self-worth in terms of
quantitative accomplishments and the accumulation of material goods. Drawing
on over two decades of clinical experience, Ulmer and Schwartzburd identify
three areas in which acceleration affects the self in detrimental ways. First, in
terms of physical health, the experience of time pressure and chronic sensory
arousal contributes to the proliferation of heart disease, high blood pressure,
obesity, emotional fatigue, insomnia and increasing tendencies toward hostility
and rage. Second, in a social or interpersonal sense, acceleration contributes to
the fragmentation of relationships and the emotional support systems of family
and friends which take time to develop and sustain, leading to an increasing
sense of isolation and loneliness. Finally, on a psychological level, Ulmer and
Schwartzburd identify a general mental state associated with acceleration that
has ‘received little attention in the empirical literature’, a mood described as ‘a
personal, perhaps even spiritual, barrenness or emptiness spawned by the 
chronic struggle to accomplish tasks, which can lead to a rather joyless existence
and give rise to covert self-destructive behaviors’ (p. 332). According to
Heidegger, the accelerated self is, quite simply, suffering from ‘boredom’
(Langeweile). Thrown into a harried world, we are so nervous, so sped up that
we become indifferent, unable to qualitatively distinguish which choices, com-
mitments, and obligations are significant or matter to us.
Although ‘anxiety’ (Angst) is the mood that receives the most attention in
Being and Time (1962), in his 1929–30 Freiburg lecture course, The Funda-
mental Concepts of Metaphysics (1995), Heidegger offers an analysis of the
mood that best captures the temperament of accelerated living, ‘boredom’.5 In
these lectures, Heidegger distinguishes between three kinds of boredom:
‘becoming bored with something’ (Gelangweiltwerden von etwas), ‘being bored
by something’ (Sichlangweilen bei etwas), and ‘being bored’ (Sichlangweilen)
itself.6 The first kind of boredom is the ordinary conception, referring to how I
encounter or find certain things or situations. For instance, I may ‘become bored
with’ a particular book, a long drive, or waiting for a flight in the airport. Indeed,
I can even find myself boring. When I am bored with something, I feel uninter-
ested, ‘indifferent’, and ‘depressed’, and I must find a way to ‘while’ (Weile)
away the time (Heidegger, 1995: 117).7 This feeling of indifference is ‘con-
spicuous’ insofar as it has an object; I am bored with such and such.
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Consequently, this form of boredom is ‘halting’ or transient insofar as it comes
and goes in the course of my life. For instance, once my plane takes off after
waiting in the airport I am no longer bored. To this end, ‘what is boring comes
from outside . . . A particular situation with its circumstances transposes us into
boredom’ (p. 128).
This kind of conspicuous boredom is contrasted with a second, more pro-
found kind. ‘Being bored by something’ is less obtrusive than the first kind of
boredom because it emerges when I make no effort to ‘while away’ the time.
Heidegger (1995) gives the example of a dinner party filled with good food,
music, and conversation. At the party, I do not notice myself ‘killing time’
because I am caught up in the ‘now’, in the activities and gossip of the social
event. When I am absorbed in these kinds of public pastimes, it is difficult for
me to notice my own boredom. In the shared moment, I am doing – eating,
drinking, laughing, singing – what ‘anyone’ (das Man) and everyone does.
Thus, this type of boredom remains hidden and inconspicuous. It is, as
Heidegger says, ‘admittedly hard to find, and this is precisely because it presents
itself in a public manner’ (p. 112). Indeed, it is only after I return home that I
realize I was bored the whole time, yet I cannot point to a particular conspicuous
thing that made the party boring. The party as a whole was boring. It just took
up time. Hence, this more profound kind of boredom does not refer to the way
we encounter particular things. Rather, it arises inconspicuously in our involve-
ment in certain public situations, therefore ‘it does not come from outside: it
arises from out of Dasein itself’ (p. 128).
Although the second form of boredom is more primordial than the first to the
extent that it conceals itself, it is similar to the first form insofar as it is situa-
tional; it lingers for a while and then goes away. This is to be contrasted with the
third, most profound kind of boredom, one that is no longer situational but refers
to the mood of the modern world itself, the entire socio-cultural horizon that we
are currently involved in. Heidegger (1995) says, ‘being bored’ or ‘profound
boredom’ (tiefe Langeweile) designates that ‘it is boring for one’. The ‘It’ (Es),
in this case, is the totality of social relations that make up the world; it is ‘beings
as a whole’ (p. 134, 138). Profound boredom, in this regard, is not transient; it
does not come and go but rather captures the fact that the world itself is boring,
and ‘everyone’ is bored. In this regard, profound boredom does not refer to my
own private, emotional states which are affected by a conspicuous thing or an
inconspicuous situation. In profound boredom, ‘we are elevated beyond the 
particular situation in each case and beyond the specific beings surrounding us’
(p. 137). Profound boredom, therefore, is regarded as a structural feature of
modern existence itself, a characteristic of our ‘situatedness’ (Befindlichkeit).
Again, situatedness, our ‘where-we’re-at-ness’,8 refers to the way in which
we find ourselves invariably thrown into a shared world that attunes or affects us
in terms of public ‘moods’ (Stimmung). Because I always find myself in a situ-
AHO: PSYCHOLOGY IN HEIDEGGER’S BEITRÄGE 31
ation that matters to me, I am already ‘attuned,’ already in a mood (Heidegger,
1962: 137). Thus, for Heidegger, the German word Stimmung is not, at its deep-
est level, to be understood subjectively, in terms of my own individual feelings
or ‘states-of-mind’. Rather, Stimmung is the condition for the possibility of these
individual states of mind.9 This means boredom is not in me; boredom is already
‘out there’. It is the shared ‘atmosphere’ I have been thrown into, an atmosphere
that opens up or discloses in advance the way things and experiences will affect
me psychologically and emotionally. Heidegger (1995) explains:
It seems as though a [mood] is in this case already there, so to speak, like an atmos-
phere in which we first immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us
through and through. It does not merely seem so, it is so; and, faced with this fact,
we must dismiss the psychology of feelings, experiences, and consciousness. 
(p. 67)
As a fundamental attunement or ‘ground-mood’ (Grund-Stimmung), profound
boredom refers to an ontological condition that attunes the accelerated self in the
technological age, a self that continually seeks to be filled up with things and 
is immersed or ‘swept away’ in ‘whatever is going on or happening around [it]’
(p. 124).
Profound boredom becomes ubiquitous because all I do is ‘pass the time’ with
the various things that occupy and consume me during the day. My whole life is
organized and managed in terms of busily ‘driving away whatever is boring’ by
means of filling up an underlying feeling of indifference or emptiness through
constant activity: work, eating out, exercising, traveling, and shopping.
Heidegger (1995) refers to activity that is endlessly dispersed in the production
and consumption of things as ‘self-forming emptiness’ (p. 126). The historian of
psychology, Philip Cushman (1990), agrees with Heidegger, describing the
‘empty self’ as one
[who] seeks the experience of being continually filled up by consuming goods,
calories, experiences, politicians, romantic partners, and empathic therapists in an
attempt to combat the growing alienation and fragmentation of its era. [It] is
dependent on the continual consumption of nonessential and quickly obsolete
items or experiences . . . accomplished through the dual creation of easy credit and
a gnawing sense of emptiness in the self. (p. 601)
On Heidegger’s view, the empty self is ‘anyone and everyone’, and because it is
so pervasive our own emptiness remains hidden from us; it is, as Heidegger
(1995: 127) says, ‘peculiarly inconspicuous’. 
The modern self, therefore, does not even know that it is bored because it has
grown into a temperament of boredom. This makes profound boredom doubly
oppressive. Initially, the frantic pace of modern life makes it increasingly diffi-
cult for us to distinguish which choices and commitments actually matter to us
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in our lives. And when we cannot distinguish what matters we become indiffer-
ent. Everything is equally important because nothing stands out, nothing 
matters. ‘In this ennui’, says Heidegger (1973), ‘nothing appeals to us anymore;
everything has as much or as little value as everything else, because a deep
boredom penetrates our existence to the core’ (pp. 50–1).
Yet, on a more profound level, we are oblivious to our own indifference
because this is what it means to be in the modern world, ‘[because] what is 
boring is here diffused throughout the particular situation as a whole, it is far
more oppressive – despite its ungraspability. It oppresses in and during the
inconspicuous way in which we are held at a distance in our passing the time’
(Heidegger, 1995: 128). As a result, the more profound the boredom, ‘the more
silent, the less public, the quieter, the more inconspicuous, and wide-ranging it
is’ (p. 134). And the boredom of the technological age has become so powerful,
so pervasive that the accelerated self ‘no longer has any power against it’ 
(p. 136). When the world as a whole shows up as a totality of instrumental things
to be consumed, produced, and exchanged in order to ‘pass the time’, then
everything is swallowed by indifference, including human beings: ‘All of the
sudden everything is enveloped and embraced by this indifference. Beings have
– as we say – become indifferent as a whole, and we ourselves as these people
are not excepted’ (p. 138). This totalizing aspect of profound boredom points to
the third concealment of the present age, ‘the outbreak of massiveness’. In 
the Beiträge, Heidegger (1999) suggests that the accelerated self has become
enfeebled because ‘the unfettered hold of the frenzy of the gigantic has over-
whelmed him under the guise of “magnitude”’ (p. 6). Today, we are living in the
reign of ‘the gigantic’ (das Riesenhafte). The world emerges as a global network
of compressed, hyper-fast relations that constantly pull us ‘everywhere and
nowhere all at once’, where ‘everything gets lumped together into a uniform 
distancelessness’ (Heidegger, 1971: 166).
For Heidegger, the reign of ‘the gigantic’ has its roots in the ancient Greek
conception of technology, understood as techne. Initially, according to Heidegger,
techne was conceived in terms of a harmony or rapport with nature, of gently
‘releasing’ that which is ‘brought forth’ to become the very thing that it is. For
instance, the Greek craftsman was, for Heidegger, one who builds ‘the old
wooden bridge’ that ‘lets the river run its course’ (Heidegger, 1977a: 17; 1977b:
330).10 This is opposed to techne in the modern age, where the hydroelectric
plant forces the river into a reservoir, into ‘water power’. The accelerated out-
break of massiveness occurs when all beings are forced to come out of conceal-
ment in only one way, as a calculable, exchangeable resource, a ‘standing
reserve’ waiting to be consumed, ‘challenged’ (Herausfordern) and ‘enframed’
(Gestell). (Heidegger, 1977a: 5, 19) It is for this reason, says Heidegger (1999),
that the reign of the gigantic ‘drives out every other possibility of revealing’ 
(p. 91).
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Today, the accelerated self is ‘bewitched, dazzled and beguiled’ by the total
domination of the gigantic, soothed by the frenzy of usable, consumable beings
(Heidegger, 1966: 56). Heidegger (1999) suggests that the reign of the gigantic
is one where we are all in a state of restless ‘enchantment’ with beings to the
point that we can no longer protect ourselves from enchantment: ‘One has only
to know from where the enchantment comes. The answer: from the unrestrained
domination of machination. When machination finally dominates and permeates
everything, then there are no longer any conditions by which to detect the
enchantment and to protect oneself from it’ (p. 87). Thus, enchantment with
beings – rooted in calculative and accelerated ways of being – comes ‘to be
accepted and practiced as the only way’ of being (Heidegger, 1966: 56). It is for
this reason that the accelerated self is in danger of living a fundamentally barren
life, one that pathologically seeks to fill an underlying emptiness.
Acceleration and Modern Psychology: A Hermeneutic Critique
How can the practice of psychology break through the illusion that our busy
enchantment with beings may be a product of indifference with the world as a
whole, an indifference that blocks off and denies any other understanding of
being? The concern is that the modern self is dispersed and scattered among
consumable beings, and, as a result, it is in on the verge of total fragmentation,
with no cohesive, unifying sense of who it is. This is precisely why, according to
Cushman (1990), the frantic cycles of consumption continue:
This is a powerful illusion. And what fuels the illusion, what impels the individual
into this illusion, is the desperation to fill up the empty self . . . It must consume in
order to be soothed and integrated; it must ‘take in’ and merge with a self-object
celebrity, an ideology, or a drug, or it will be in danger of fragmenting into feel-
ings of worthlessness and confusion. (p. 606)
The situation is particularly troubling if we understand that mainstream psy-
chology largely overlooks the social and historical conditions that create this
modern sense of fragmentation by uncritically adopting the disengaged and
mechanistic perspective of the natural sciences.
Understood as ‘the science of mental processes and human behavior’, the dis-
cipline of psychology is a historical outgrowth of the 18th-century paradigm of
the natural sciences in two fundamental ways. First, psychology is concerned
with a specific ‘method’ or procedure based on the observation of material objects
in causal interaction, interaction that can be empirically tested and systematically
quantified, resulting in the discovery of general laws. In this regard, modern 
psychology attempts to reduce behavior to elemental causes that are measurable,
testable, and repeatable. Indeed, as Bertrand Russell (1956) suggests, one of the
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goals of psychology was to develop ‘a mathematics of human behavior as precise
as the mathematics of machines’ (p. 142; see also Gergen, 1973). Second, 
psychology seeks a perspective of detached objectivity, what Thomas Nagel
(1979: 208) calls, a ‘view from nowhere’ that is free from the distortions and 
misleading assumptions of everyday life. This disengaged perspective downplays
the fact that our emotional well-being is largely shaped by a concrete social and
historical context, focusing instead on the physical pathology of the individual.
From this standpoint, psychology is left with a very narrow approach to therapy,
one that is concerned with ‘repairing damage within a disease model of human
functioning’ (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000: 5).
In his Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger (2001) maintains that all of the various
manifestations of modern psychology, including psychoanalysis, are held under
‘the dictatorship’ of the scientific method that reduces human behavior to ele-
mental causal interactions and views emotional suffering from the perspective
of detached objectivity. Freud (1964) confirms Heidegger’s criticism when he
claims ‘psychoanalysis must accept the scientific Weltanschauung’ (my empha-
sis) because ‘the intellect and the mind are objects for scientific research in
exactly the same way as non-human beings . . . Our best hope for the future is
that intellect – the scientific spirit, reason – may in the process of time establish
a dictatorship in the mental life of man’ (p. 171; see also Askay, 2001).
Today, the ‘scientific spirit’ has emerged as psychopharmacology, which has
replaced psychoanalysis as the dominant therapeutic model. On this view, the
psychiatrist invariably refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994), a document that catalogues a massive list of
observable pathologies, identifies various symptoms, and prescribes ways in
which to treat the causes of these symptoms. A client, for instance, with observ-
able symptoms of depression is prescribed medication in order to fix the bio-
logically determined cause, specifically, the chemical levels of serotonin and
dopamine in the brain. The medication will balance these levels, block out the
feelings of depression and emptiness, and allow the client to effectively and
functionally re-enter his/her rapid-paced world. This approach to therapy is
problematic.
First of all, psychopharmacology, like psychoanalysis, presupposes a concep-
tion of the self that is, in no way, trans-historical. It is a conception rooted in
uniquely modern assumptions of individualism and causal determinism (Taylor,
1988; Cushman, 1990). The therapist interprets the client as an encapsulated
thing or object that needs to be fixed by means of instrumental techniques and
fails to address the underlying socio-historical etiology that may be contributing
to the client’s disorder. Furthermore, the therapist interprets the mental health of
the client largely in terms of his/her competence in handling the frantic pace of
modern life, and this has a tendency to perpetuate the very social conditions that
manifested the feelings of indifference and emptiness in the first place. (Taylor,
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1988; Cushman, 1990). In short, by ignoring the fact that the practice of psy-
chology itself and the emotional conditions that it treats are shaped by our
involvement in a particular social and historical situation, our own emptiness, as
Heidegger (1995) says, continues to remain hidden from us. 
Indeed, it can be argued that many of the newest illnesses in the latest DSM
are a direct result of accelerated social conditions. Among these we might
include: (1) the most ubiquitous anxiety disorders mediated by chronic sensory
arousal and time pressure, such as ‘panic disorder’, ‘generalized anxiety dis-
order’, and ‘social phobia’; (2) personality disorders perpetuated by a culture
that values rapid multi-tasking and racing thought patterns, such as ‘obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder’ and ‘attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder’;
and (3) impulse disorders based on socially determined expectations of instant
satisfaction or gratification, such as ‘pathological gambling and shopping dis-
order’, ‘kleptomania’, and ‘intermittent explosive disorder’. The mechanistic
approach to curing these illnesses results in a paradox if what is causing the 
disorder is itself an accelerated, mechanized way of living.
The way therapy is provided today illustrates this paradox. With market
forces and health trusts imposing time restraints on patient visits, today’s psy-
chiatric sessions are increasingly compressed and mediated by assumptions of
efficiency and cost-effectiveness, where the therapist is there to either quickly
teach the client cognitive-behavioral techniques or prescribe and refill psycho-
tropic medication. Thus, by overlooking the way in which the practice of psy-
chology itself is shaped by an accelerated world, psychologists and psychiatrists
have not only been treating the accelerated self, ‘they have also been construct-
ing it, profiting from it, and not challenging the social arrangement that created
it’ (Cushman, 1990: 609).
Even alternative forms of therapy that do not focus on the pathological condi-
tion of the client fail to articulate the fundamental role that our socio-historical
situation plays in determining emotional well-being. Charles Guignon’s (2002)
critique of the renewed interest in ‘positive psychology’ is a case in point.11
Positive psychology is defined as ‘a science of positive subjective experience,
positive individual traits, and positive institutions [that] promises to improve the
quality of life and prevent the pathologies that arise when life is barren and
meaningless’ (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000: 6). To this end, positive
psychology does not address the observable symptoms of the disorder. Rather, it
embraces the active agency of the client who now focuses his/her energies not
on the dark moods of emptiness and ennui but on the positive and optimistic
qualities of life, even if such qualities are simply illusions: ‘One of the most
impressive findings . . . of positive psychology is that positive illusions and
unrealistic optimism are in fact beneficial to people, helping them cope with
stressful events and extending their lives’ (Guignon, 2002: 86). This refocusing
on positive illusions will allow the client to interpret himself/herself as a ‘deci-
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sion maker with choices, preferences, and the possibility of becoming masterful
[and] efficacious’ (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000: 8).
What remains problematic is that the optimistic values promoted by positive
psychology are not timeless; they are themselves products of a technological
economy aimed at efficacy and quick-fixes. For instance, as Guignon (2002)
points out, the client does not embrace the positive virtues of Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics such as shame, wittiness, pride, and courage, nor does
he/she focus on the Judeo-Christian virtues of humility, selflessness, and meek-
ness. Rather, the psychologist asks the client to focus on uniquely modern 
values that accommodate the interpretation of the self that psychology inherits
from Cartesian and empiricist epistemologies. Thus, the self is interpreted as an
enclosed, masterful, autonomous subject that can manipulate and effectively
control surrounding objects. This leads the client of positive psychology to focus
on values such as ‘self-determination’ (Schwartz, 2000), ‘adaptability’ (Vaillant,
2000), ‘creativity’ (Simonton, 2000), and ‘individual happiness’ (Buss, 2000).
In doing so, the now optimistic and self-assertive client will be empowered,
able to master the accelerated work-world as an effective and optimally func-
tioning individual. This means, however, that the therapist fails to acknowledge
the fact that the client’s positive values are themselves socially and historically
constructed. This results in a twofold dilemma. First, the therapist overlooks the
possibility of older, alternative virtues that are part of our shared history such as
communal belongingness, attachment, and dependency in favor of ultra-modern
individualism and autonomy. The therapist, therefore, is unable to address the
client’s contemporary experience of isolation and emptiness because the client
continues to interpret himself/herself as a self-reliant subject who is cut off from
the world rather than someone who belongs to it. Furthermore, by uncritically
adopting the values of a technological economy, positive psychology reinforces
the same instrumental, accelerated way of living that initially brought about the
client’s feelings of emptiness.
To this end, Heidegger’s project reveals how psychology continues to ‘mis-
interpret’ the self as either a masterful, subjective consciousness or a quantifi-
able, causally determined object. ‘I am always disturbed by [psychology’s] 
misinterpretation of being-in-the-world’, says Heidegger (2001: 271), ‘it is con-
ceived either as a present-at-hand [thing] or as the intentionality of subjective
consciousness’. For Heidegger, psychology is called to acknowledge the onto-
logical fact that the self is always already ‘being-in-the-world’, and it is this
ongoing involvement in the world that makes possible the modern interpretation
of the self. This is why understanding human existence in terms of Dasein can
be so helpful to psychology. With Heidegger, the world is not interpreted as a
container filled with objects within which the self resides. Rather, the world is a
meaningful nexus of social relations, and the self is already concretely involved
with and embedded in this nexus. As Heidegger (1982) says, ‘self and world
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belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. Self and world are not two
beings, like subject and object, or I and thou, but self and world are the basic
determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-
world’ (p. 318).
By dismantling the philosophical assumptions of the modern worldview,
Heidegger shows us how the practice of psychology can be enhanced by focus-
ing on the socio-historical aspect of the manifestation of individual pathologies.
Modern psychology, on this view, does not discover timeless principles of
human behavior. The therapeutic practice of psychology itself is a historical
phenomenon, the result of an increasingly accelerated, mechanized, and indi-
vidualistic way of life that began to take hold in the late 19th century, a way of
life that brought with it its own brand of emotional malaise. Turn-of-the-century
philosophers and social theorists, like Heidegger, responded to this cultural
transformation by introducing and redefining terms – such as anxiety
(Kierkegaard), boredom (Simmel), alienation (Marx), disenchantment (Weber),
the mass man (Ortega y Gasset) and anomie (Durkheim) – in order to engage
these emerging pathologies. Thus, in order to properly understand the self, psy-
chology must come to grips with the movement of history that shapes the under-
standing of who we are. Indeed, ‘to understand history’, as Heidegger (1997: 7)
reminds us, ‘cannot mean anything else than to understand the self’. 
Conclusion
We can summarize Heidegger’s contribution to modern psychology in the fol-
lowing way. First, by identifying interconnected ‘symptoms’ of modernity in the
Beiträge – ‘calculation’, ‘acceleration’, and ‘massiveness’ – Heidegger (1999)
reveals how the frenzied pace of technological life embodies a ‘hidden distress’
in the inconspicuous cultural mood of boredom. By emphasizing a standpoint of
detached objectivity, psychology overlooks the social forms that manifest this
shared feeling of indifference and fails to recognize the ways in which the
modern self drives away this indifference with the frantic consumption and pro-
duction of goods and services. This disengaged perspective makes it all but
impossible for psychologists and psychiatrists to recognize how they participate
in the construction of the accelerated self.
Second, by emphasizing how our everyday understanding of things as well as
our moods and dispositions are always already mediated by a socio-historical
situation, Heidegger deconstructs the modern conception of the self as an
autonomous subject or a biologically determined object. He, therefore, under-
mines the traditional interpretation of the detached therapist who neutrally
examines the objective symptoms of the client. By uncritically adopting this
interpretation, psychology neglects the concrete situation that is already there,
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shaping the emotional state and comportment of client and therapist alike.
Heidegger reveals that the therapist is, first and foremost, not a disengaged 
spectator but a ‘being-in-the-world’, pre-theoretically involved in the public
practices and assumptions of modernity. In this regard, the self is what
Heidegger calls, ‘ex-static’. As human beings, we ‘stand outside’ of ourselves
because we are already woven to the particular worldly context – of equipment,
institutions, habits, and prejudices – that we are involved in everyday.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Heidegger’s project opens up the 
possibility for mainstream psychology to broaden its approach to treatment by
incorporating a wide-ranging historical and cultural understanding of individual
pathologies (Cushman, 1995; Dreyfus and Wakefield, 1988; Askay, 2001;
Guignon, 2002). This understanding enables the psychologist to break free 
from, what Heidegger (2001) calls, ‘scientism’, where science is dogmatically
accepted as ‘the new religion’ insofar as its method alone can provide us with
the objective truth about human behavior (p. 18). In his Zollikon Seminars
Heidegger (2001) explains, ‘science is, to an almost incredible degree, dogmatic
everywhere, that is, it operates with preconceptions and prejudices which have
not been reflected on. There is the highest need for doctors who think and do not
wish to leave the field entirely to the scientific technicians’ (p. 103).
By regarding the human being as ‘an object which is present-at-hand’, psy-
chology ignores our ontological character, that prior to any objectification, we
are a finite, socio-historical way of being, a way of being that opens up the 
Dasein, the ‘clearing’ or ‘there’ that makes any worldview, scientific or other-
wise, possible. Heidegger’s hermeneutic approach to psychology reveals the
extent to which science is always already grounded in an unfolding historical
horizon. Such an approach can release the therapist from the dogmatic preju-
dices of the scientific method and release the client from an increasingly narrow
definition of the self that is rooted in modern assumptions of individualism, self-
reliance, and busyness. It is largely on the basis of these assumptions, after all,
that the contemporary experiences of isolation and nervous indifference mani-
fest, leading so many into therapy in the first place. 
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A draft of this article was presented to the American Society for Philosophy, Counseling,
and Psychotherapy (ASPCP) at the American Philosophical Association Central Division
Meetings in Chicago, April 2006.
1. These seminars began in September of 1959 as a series of lectures with Heidegger
and psychiatrists from the University of Zurich’s medical clinic, Burghölzli. The
seminars later moved to the house of one of Heidegger’s close friends, the psychia-
trist Medard Boss, who lived in Zollikon. See Aho (2005) for further discussion of
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the importance of the Zollikon Seminars and the role they play in Heidegger’s pro-
ject of fundamental ontology.
2. Besides ‘Echo’, Heidegger lists ‘Playing-Forth’, ‘Leap’, ‘Grounding’, ‘The Ones to
Come’, and ‘The Last God’ as the other fugues. These fugues are not to be under-
stood as progressive or chronologically ordered, but as repetitions of the same move-
ment of history or ‘be-ing’, which Heidegger (1999) refers to with the 18th-century
orthography Seyn:
In each of the six joining the attempt is made always to say the same [das
Selbe] of the same, but in each case from within another essential domain of
that which enowning names. Seen externally and fragmentarily, one easily
finds ‘repetitions’ everywhere. But what is most difficult is purely to enact in
accord with the jointure, a persevering with the same, this witness of genuine
inabiding of inceptual thinking. (p. 57)
3. Heidegger dismantles the ordinary interpretation of time, understood as a linear
‘process’ (Vorgang) or sequence of ‘nows’ that can be measured and organized by
means of clocks and calendars into hours, days, weeks, and years. For Heidegger,
everyday ‘clock time’ is itself made possible by ‘primordial time’, understood as an
interconnected manifold of the ‘ecstatic’ structures of Past (Gewesenheit), Present
(Gegenwart) and Future (Zukunft). These structures represent the a priori scaffold-
ing or frame of reference on the basis of which things can show up as the very things
that they are.
4. According to Ulmer and Schwartzburd (1996), hurry sickness can be diagnosed if the
subject suffers from, among other things: (1) ‘deterioration of the personality,
marked primarily by loss of interest in aspects of life except those connected with
achievement of goals and by a preoccupation with numbers, with a growing tendency
to evaluate life in terms of quantity rather than quality’; (2) ‘racing mind syndrome,
characterized by rapid, shifting thoughts that gradually erode the ability to focus 
and concentrate and create disruption of sleep’; (3) ‘loss of ability to accumulate
pleasant memories, mainly due to either preoccupation with future events or rumina-
tion about past events, with little attention to the present’ (p. 332).
5. This course expands on Heidegger’s inaugural Freiburg lecture given on 24 July
1929 entitled ‘What Is Metaphysics?’ In this lecture, the mood of boredom is
explored for the first time.
6. Here I am indebted to Emad (1985) for the thorough analysis of Heidegger’s con-
ception of boredom.
7. To this end, the German word for boredom captures something that the French or
English renditions cannot. Langeweile is literally the unpleasant mood that accom-
panies an empty stretch of time; it is ‘the lengthening and lingering of the while
(Weile)’. See Emad (1985: 67).
8. This translation is taken from Hubert Dreyfus (1991) who suggests that the term con-
veys ‘being found in a situation where things and options already matter’ (p. 168).
9. See Aho (2006) for a more involved discussion of Stimmung and the ways in which
it shapes our own emotional states.
10. Heidegger (1999) confirms this shift from the pre-modern to modern manifestation
of techne in the Beiträge when he writes:
What happens to nature in technicity, when nature is separated out from beings
AHO: PSYCHOLOGY IN HEIDEGGER’S BEITRÄGE 41by the natural sciences? The growing – or better, the simple rolling unto its end
– destruction of ‘nature’. What was it once? The site for the moment of the
arrival and dwelling of gods, when the site – rested in the essential swaying of
be-ing. (p. 195)
11. For instance, the journal American Psychologist recently devoted an entire volume
(55/1, 2000) to the resurgent movement of positive psychology. References
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